Within the project of constructing a critical theory of library and information science (LIS) or librarianship 1 , Michel Foucault (1926 is one of the primary thinkers informing this work. He is widely cited in this LIS work and his insights are adapted in various ways which focus on LIS forms of power, discourse, etc. Other thinkers have focused on Foucault's topics, yet it is Foucault who is far more central to the project at hand. Librarianship has taken up the challenge set down previously to more fully explore his work, and having responded to that challenge, it is now time to look more carefully at the implications of Foucault's thinking as a foundation for a critical-theoretical LIS. His work has undergone extensive analysis and critique, and this article is a similar first step within LIS. While not a comprehensive review of every Foucauldian idea that has filtered into the literature, a review of common themes utilized by a core group of LIS authors is undertaken. The paper will then turn to critiques of and problems in Foucault's thinking since it is the contention here that, by relying on Foucault's insights for a line of analysis and research, this LIS theoretical work will reflect some of those problems.
Introduction
Michel Foucault (1926 stands as one of the primary wellsprings informing the project of constructing a viable, critical theory of library and information science (LIS) or librarianship. He is widely cited and his insights are adapted in various works which focus on LIS forms of power, discourse, archaeology, silences, exclusion, defining the "other," domination and micropractices in the last fifteen years of critical-theoretical LIS scholarship [see for example 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10]. For instance, this journal, in issuing a call for papers (CFP) on "discursive approaches to information seeking in context" for a future issue, is sponsoring a line of analysis heavily influenced by Primary Foucauldian ideas like discourse, socially-constructed knowledge, and artifacts are embedded in that CFP. Foucault described discursive practices as "not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them" [12, p. 200; see also 13, p. 38]. The concept is understood here as "the intertwining of ... non-documentary practices ... with language, symbols, drawings, shop talk, ideologies, and the production of documents" [6, p. 231] . Similarly, the reference to socially constructed knowledge and practices utilizes Foucault's analysis of the human sciences: "Beneath the increasing leniency of punishment [is] a whole new system of truth and a mass of rules hitherto unknown in the exercise of criminal justice. A corpus of knowledge, techniques, 'scientific' discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of the power to punish" [14, pp. 22-23] . Finally, in studying particulars and the constructed meanings of artifacts in everyday life, Foucault's concern with silences and what has been overlooked [15; 16] -allowing obscure police and prison manuals and medical texts or institutional architecture to "speak for themselves" -is echoed. That is, they are to "be viewed without resort to the subject ... reveal[ing] a level of intelligibility all their own" [17, p.
143, see also pp. 142-147; 18, pp. [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] . By looking at the mundane (informationally speaking) and analyzing how we construct our practices and invest our artifacts, we construct knowledge from the bottom up, unconcerned with understanding wholes or logical systems, but rather "features that help to reverse the traditional strategy of Foucault's notions of analyzing representation ("media stereotypes of librarians ... that ultimately constricts the power and economic status of a gendered profession") which drives the analysis in the article [22] . Much the same can be said of another work already cited here: while Lyotard and Baudrillard are both included, it is Foucault's work on discourse -again cited but also filtered through Mark Poster, Nancy Fraser, and Marike A core group in librarianship has seemingly taken up the challenge laid down by Harris [24] and Wiegand [25] to more fully explore Foucault's work, and having responded to that challenge, it is now time to look more carefully at the implications of his thinking, which has undergone extensive review, analysis, and critique. This article is a first step in this vein within LIS. This will not be a comprehensive review of every Foucauldian notion or citation of his work that has filtered into the literature, but rather a review of common themes utilized by that core group of LIS authors involved in the aforementioned project. Their work: 1) utilizes or explores Foucault's ideas prominently; 2) appears primarily in the most prestigious journal venues of theory (in the study cited earlier [2] -and thus is widely cited and influential); 3) avoids methodological approaches via constructivist (social or otherwise), user studies, and notions of "seeking" which run afoul of Foucault's epistemological critiques of subject/object, content, and agency and lead to positivism [23] . The paper will then turn to critiques of and problems in Foucault's thinking since it is the contention here that, by relying on Foucault's insights for a line of analysis and research, this theory of librarianship will reflect some of the problems in his work.
Foucauldian Themes in LIS
This review and sampling of Foucault in librarianship will not escape the problem Walzer identified: a constructivist reconstruction of Foucault since he "never presented [his ideas] in anything like a systematic fashion," his ideas overlap, and one must ignore certain self-denials. For instance, despite Foucault's participation in the radical deconstruction of the meaning of "author," he simply "takes him to be an author in the conventional sense" making arguments and claims to plausibility with acolytes who conventionally pursue research agendas along lines laid out by his authored writings [26, pp. 193-94] . Poster also notes some of the same basic issues [17, p. 152]. Second, this review will not be an intramural disagreement regarding the "correct" interpretation of Foucault, but rather in the spirit of its subject, will take this appropriation on its face as a discourse. Given these two caveats, his ideas as appropriated and used in LIS criticaltheoretical work will be grouped here in four thematic areas: discourse, power/ knowledge, fantasia, and genealogy/archaeology. Before taking up these themes, it is worth noting that one common, overriding use of Foucault's thinking in this literaturethat of the critique of positivism and instrumental reason -will not be reviewed since it is a subject extensively covered already [see the summary of summaries in 1] and need not be repeated here.
Discourse
The single most influential idea in LIS theoretical work appropriated from Foucault is discourse -noted earlier and restated here as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" [18, p. 70] . It is discourse in this Foucauldian sense which has been around in this literature the longest, primarily as a form of critical self-reflection. For instance, Frohmann [27, pp. 120-121] has long argued the salience of discourse analysis, which takes discourse as its object of analysis…. LIS-talk is a set of serious speech acts [which are] performed by institutionally privileged speakers…. From at least 1876, to the present day, the discourses of LIS are thoroughly intertwined with specific institutional forms through which power over information, its users, and its uses is, has been, and will continue to be exercised.
From this basis he moved on to argue for a connection between discourse and documentary practices in librarianship, building on another of Foucault's insights on the documentation of surveillance and its part in the "mechanisms of discipline" [Foucault in 28, p. 18]. Frohmann has since critically focused on discourse and documentary practices and the resulting authority invested in science, information science, and LIS's role in privileging instrumental epistemologies, definitions, and forms of knowledge which obscure the operation of power [4; 6; 27; 28] . "LIS theory is so extraordinarily unreflective about its institutional underpinnings to warrant the hypothesis that power's invisibility is the consequence of a deliberate discursive strategy" [4, p. 368] .
Radford (with different coauthors at various times) has explored similar ideas:
"The key to understanding the production of scientific knowledge is not the phenomena comprising the world but the prevailing systems of … discourse in which certain propositions about the world can count as objective and others cannot" [29, p. 417 ].
However, it would be fair to characterize Radford over the years as focused more on specific library practices and images of libraries/librarians as the discourse to be unpacked. For instance, he often cites as a basis of analysis libraries' organized collections of texts and the "ensemble of rules [by] which the true and false are separated" [29, p. 418; see also 5; 7] or the contrasts between the library-as-discourseunder-control/surveillance and the power embedded therein and the (sometimes) contrasting media discourse of stereotyped images of librarians [22; 30] . He is the author most explicitly concerned with explaining Foucault and his meaning for the field, and arguing that discourse "itself [i]s a legitimate object of inquiry," going on to write in the article he wrote about the article he had written that was being read at that moment:
"what is important is not what [a prior] sentence means, but that it has appeared in this article." Radford explains that all these together form a Foucauldian "statement," and their importance is not their veracity, but rather their existence in relationship to one another and "the conditions in which texts appear" [7, pp. 4, 11] . Used simultaneously as a tool/method and as a way to define various texts/statements/speech acts as objects of study, Foucauldian discourse analysis is often argued to be a means to achieve reflexive practice in the field [see also 8; 31; 32] . It is his negations -anti-Enlightenment, anti-modernity, anti-Marx, anti-Freud, anti-truth, anti-logocentrism, etc.-which define Foucault. Foucauldian individual action, such as it is, is aptly named by John Tate [48] as an "ethic of transgression." If there is no separate "self" -only that which is constituted by the discourses which dominate it -then human freedom is foreclosed. There will only arise another discourse to define, control, and dominate the individual who has no particular reason to transgress [48; 49; 50] .
Foucault never reconciled his assertion that his work was to "give new impetus … to the undefined work of freedom" [51, p. 46] with statements that he "did not think that it is possible to say that one thing is of the order of 'liberation' and another is of the order of societies" and formal rights (however incomplete) which allowed labor to organize and exert political influence. Foucault turns this on its head: since totalitarianism exists/ existed, it must be implicated in the systems and discourse which make us "free."
"Freedom" is therefore a masked discourse/text of domination/discipline/control, of which we are unaware and cannot transcend.
On the matter of the textual "death of the subject," feminists and minorities have been quite pointed: "Why is it, exactly at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes 'problematic'? ... And why is it only now that critiques are made of the will to power inherent in [our] effort to create theory?" [Hartsock in 56, p. 24] This is a point echoed repeatedly: this theoretical construct and its language "is as hegemonic as the world it attacks.., surfac [H]er authority to interpret her own work ... would seem to be somewhat at odds with ... Foucault [in] that meaning/significance is not determined Two further points needs to be made here concerning self-referentiality and authority. First, Frohmann's earlier description of LIS discourse from 1876 to the present as an exercise in power over information and users can certainly be critiqued in its own Foucauldian terms. It appropriates a discourse and describes its boundaries in order to form a "discipline" in the dual Foucauldian sense [42, p. 191 ]: 1) as an exercise in "discipline" (power) via a methodology, and; 2) as a categorization subsuming the discourse and thus forming the "discipline" of LIS -simultaneously configuring a field of ignorance as he put it. What vantage point of authority does a Foucauldian LIS analysis assume that puts it outside of such a critique -and again, toward what ends? Second, this discourse, though prominent, is (to quote Frohmann again) "performed by institutionallyprivileged speakers": LIS professors and those with requisite prestige from other fields who have taken an interest in librarianship. This in itself is not necessarily remarkable, but the problem of self-referentiality is real. One respondent to a study of LIS researchers noted that "we're a small field [and] we all know one another, we all talk to each other, we all go to the same conferences. And perhaps this is why there is not much negative citation; we don't want to give too much criticism to each other" [in 66]. There are other examples, but the point suffices. However, it is the reaction to those outside this circle (an important Foucauldian concept unreflexively utilized in this literature) which is revealing. For instance, an author at some remove who characterized LIS writing as "this incredible stream of garbage" was described as "uncharitable," while two others affiliated with U.S. library schools (and journals in the field) who came to similar conclusions are Most pointedly, when a library director challenged some of this literature (in this journal), the reaction was swift and thorough [67; 36] . Foucauldian unconcern with "accuracy" and "truth" went out the window in that case, and again, this literature seems to assume a vantage-less point of authority and critique at times.
Image
Separated from Habermas's "excitement stylized into the other of reason," the state-of-the-art Foucauldian language and focus on various "texts" seems to settle around an age-old bane of the profession: poor image. While the choice to analyze stereotypes in movies (Party Girl [22] , Pagemaster, Sophie's Choice, UHF [5] ) and in commercials [30] serves to unpack those images, they still focus on an issue that the field has been rightly criticized for being obsessed with for many years and trivializing of our work and research. (Thistlethwaite's essay "Old Maids and Fairies" captured why the "image problem" bothers us (particularly men) so much: because the "stereotypes read QUEER with a capital Q" [68] .) Echoing Brosio, unpacking these popular media images is a "lite" form of transgression, and while amusing, does nothing to challenge the widespread gender discrepancies in images of power, competence, and authority as they relate to technology by librarians and information workers -at least one area where these analyses might have some positive effect [69] . His analysis only leads to more discourse analysis, more deconstruction of essential term/ concepts, and more fragmentation. There is for Day always a larger frame of discourse and domination surrounding us "requiring" it, and there is simultaneously no subject of or ground to define and defend "freedom" -the binary of "necessity."
It may be transgressive to focus on discursive patterns and contradictions in LIS, or deconstruct media images and reveal their embedded discursive power, but Habermas's dismissal of the "capering" and "cynical" intellectual byproducts of a focus on "the refuse dumps of civilization ... camouflaged with plastic" is well taken [46, pp. 83, 97] . A variation on an earlier comment is that Foucault's work "seems to be a strategy without a subject" [18, p. 89 (emphasis in original)]. As Walzer put it, "one can't be critical, unless one inhabits some social setting and adopts, however tentatively, its codes and categories.
Or unless ... one constructs ... a new setting and works out new codes and categories.
Foucault refuses to do either" [26, p. 209] . It is the argument here that Foucault's place at the center of this literature represents, ultimately, not transgression with a purpose, but stasis. The aim is not conservative, but the result is. A Foucauldian reading is only a partial "reading" of the library "text." It is a conceptual import with its own discursive agenda which rules out all or most of the end purposes of such a critique.
Like many of Foucault's critics, I am not content to leave it there. The goal has been to highlight a longstanding problematic within his work that has been analyzed and written about extensively and bring it to bear on that part of librarianship's criticaltheoretical project which utilizes his thinking. As this author has written elsewhere, critical educational scholarship offers an instructive and germane example of a field which has struggled with the push-pull of these ideas and how to productively incorporate them [65] . Toward that end Henry Giroux notes that rather than negating the modernist concern with public life and critical rationality [we must] provide... the grounds on which to deepen and extend such concerns.
[E]ngagements with foundationalism, culture, difference, and subjectivity provide the basis for questioning the modernist ideal of what constitutes a decent, humane, and good life. ...Talk about the public must be simultaneously about the discourse of an engaged plurality and critical citizenship ... and conditions that organize public life as a democratic social form rather than as a regime of terror and opposition.
[W]hat is being argued for is a language in which different voices and traditions exist and flourish to the degree that they listen to the voices of others, engage in an ongoing attempt to eliminate forms of subjective and objective suffering, and maintain those conditions in which the act of communicating and living extends rather than restricts the creation of bifurcates theory and practice, and sternly enjoins against a purpose, then possibility is precluded and we are, in the words of the educational philosopher Maxine Greene, foreclosed from "thinking of things as if they could be otherwise" [76, p. 116] .
